

on July 6 with other delegations concerning the proposed resolution in the Security Council to set up a unified command. General support for the resolution was indicated, including that of the Latin American caucus. Signs that Yugoslavia and Egypt were coming around to support the line of action being followed were also reported. (Tel 28) - - - - - TAB 1

2. 10:00 a.m. -- At the Under Secretary's meeting, Mr. Webb said the Secretary had directed that regardless of possible temptations to the contrary, no officer of the State Department was to engage in any activity or make any statement tending to disrupt harmonious relations among Government Departments. -- The British desire to review the legal implications of the Korean blockade was discussed at the meeting. -- Mr. Hickerson reported that Senator McMahon had suggested a public threat to try North Korean leaders for war crimes. -- Mr. McGhee reported considerable sentiment in the Far West in favor of a renunciation by the U. S. of the Yalta Agreement on grounds its terms had already been broken by the Russians. (UM M-216) - - - - - TAB 2

3. 11:00 a.m. -- Dr. Tan, Chinese Minister, delivered an Aide-Memoire to Mr. Merchant concerning the military policy of the Chinese Nationalists. He emphasized orally those paragraphs which stated that the Chinese Nationalists felt they must carry on reconnaissance, and that they considered as of especial importance the maintenance of existing Nationalist positions on various off-shore Chinese islands. (Memo by Clubb) - - - - - TAB 3

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| DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR           |                     |
| REVIEWED BY <u>[Signature]</u>         | DATE <u>7/14/51</u> |
| REASON(S) <u>[Blank]</u>               |                     |
| EXISTING MARKINGS <u>[Blank]</u>       |                     |
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4. 12:00 Noon -- The Department instructed Ambassador Douglas to tell Bevin or Younger immediately that the U.S. was inclined to regard Gromyko's approach as a serious effort to end the Korean affair, that we were unwilling to bargain any positions in exchange for termination of aggression against South Korea, that we believed the British in Moscow should play the matter out somewhat further without involving the U.S. or other governments in order to get a clearer picture of what the Soviets had in mind. It was suggested that the British Ambassador tell Gromyko that "UK believes details of arrangements for withdrawal NK forces and restoration status quo ante ... could be worked out if USSR willing to use its influence NK forces to obtain acceptance three specific points of June 25 resolution." (Tel 83) - - - - - TAB 4

5. 12:56 p.m. -- Ambassador Chapin reported that the Netherlands Government so far had taken no steps despite the promise of a week earlier to take immediate energetic action to apply export controls to China and North Korea. (Tel 23) - - - - - TAB 5

6. 1:19 p.m. -- Embassy Paris reported that the U.S. delegation in the Coordination Committee on Export Controls had requested a vote for the application of international controls on exports to Red China and North Korea. Since the Netherlands delegation was absent, the Embassy at the Hague had been asked to urge that the delegation be instructed. (Tel 108) - - - - - TAB 6

7. 1:37 p.m. -- The Political Adviser in Japan reported that General MacArthur had told him that he had explained to the Chief of the Chinese Mission in Tokyo that he fully concurred with the Washington view that the defense of Taiwan should not be weakened at present

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present rather than send under-armed troops to Korea it would be preferable to build up their strength on Formosa. MacArthur also said he would visit Formosa at the first opportunity. (Tel 54) -- TAB 7

8. 2:09 p.m. -- Embassy Athens reported that the Greek Government had announced prohibition of all exports of every kind to North Korea. (Tel 73) -- TAB 8

9. 3:00 p.m. -- The Security Council met and considered the draft resolution calling for a unified command for UN forces in Korea with the commander to be designated by the United States. The resolution was introduced by the United Kingdom and France, and was adopted by seven votes to none, Egypt, India and Yugoslavia abstaining. (Security Council Document S/1688 and Security Council Official Records No. 18) -- TAB 9

10. 4:12 p.m. -- Embassy London suggested that the Department be prepared to offset the possible adverse effects of a dispatch filed from Seoul on March 14 by New York Times Correspondent Walter Sullivan reporting that 13 South Korean deputies had been jailed for treason because, among other crimes, they were opposed to the invasion of North Korea by South Korea forces. Communists in Britain were understood to be planning republication and exploitation of the article. (Tel 140) -- TAB 10

11. 6:24 p.m. -- Ambassador Douglas reported that "influential Foreign Office officials" were "increasingly anxious" to obtain the admission of a Chinese Communist representative to the UN at the earliest practicable moment, "whetted by the conviction that nothing would please Moscow more than the complete divorcement of China from occidental influence and culture." It was realized, however, he said, that the present was not a "propitious occasion

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July 7, 1950 (Continued)

for Active British support Chinese Communists in UN." (Tel 136)

-- Foreign Secretary Bevin in a message to Ambassador Franks, a copy of which the latter transmitted to the Department, stated that he believed it likely the latest Soviet move meant they really did wish to restore the status quo in Korea. But, he said, this move "has forced us to ask ourselves the question what the attitude of the United States would be if the Russians agreed to help in restoring the status quo in Korea in return for United States readiness to reconsider their present declared attitude in regard to Formosa." He felt sure the Russians would link the Formosa question to any settlement they might propose, and since the U.S. policy on Formosa did not have the backing of other powers there was "risk of a breach in the international solidarity happily achieved over Korea." He thought it would be wise for the U.S. to "play down" those parts of the President's statement of June 27 which did not bear directly on Korea. (Copy Bevin to Franks) - - - - - TAB 11

12. 7:00 p.m. -- The Department informed Embassy Karachi that it was much interested in a statement by the Pakistan Secretary of Defense that Pakistan should offer at least a brigade for Korea if events required. The Embassy was requested, if the subject should be mentioned again by any responsible Pakistan source, to "evidence interest on basis of US policy of full support of UN, and report fully."

(Tel 12) - - - - - TAB 12

#### Other Actions, July 7

(Listed here are entries for which no exact time is available.)

13. Mr. Rusk, in a letter to General Burns in the Office of the

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Secretary of Defense, urged that the meaning of the aide-memoire replying to the Chinese Nationalist offer of troops for use in Korea be clarified. He pointed out that the aide-memoire was not intended as approval of a proposal made by General MacArthur to Secretary Johnson for the former to conduct an over-all political, economic, and military survey of Formosa. MacArthur's proposal, Rusk indicated, had not been officially brought to the attention of the Department of State. (Letter Rusk to Burns) - - - - - TAB 13

14. Mr. Dulles, in a memo for the Secretary, suggested that the President "emphasize by personal message to General MacArthur the delicate nature of the responsibilities which he will be carrying, not only on behalf of the United States but on behalf of the United Nations, and the importance of instructing his staff to comply scrupulously with political and military limitations and instructions which may be sent, the reasons for which may not always be immediately apparent but which will often have behind them political consideration of gravity." (Dulles Memo) - - - - - TAB 14

15. Mr. Fisher stated to the Legal Adviser of the British Embassy his "personal view that the blockade rested upon the same basis as did the actual military operations in Korea" and that "the UN aspect of this particular action made it a somewhat different operation than that of the traditional blockade." The British view seemed to be that some legal foundation for the blockade was required, either in a declaration of belligerency or in a special action of the Security Council. (Memo by Fisher) - - - - - TAB 15

16. The Chinese Ambassador asked Mr. Rusk what information the U.S. had on Chinese Communist intentions with respect to Formosa and Hong Kong, also whether the U.S. was discussing with the UK the

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July 7, 1950 (Continued)

cessation of petroleum shipments to Communist China, and whether General MacArthur had arranged to send officers to Formosa to discuss the Chinese offer of troops for service in Korea. Mr. Rusk said he was unable to provide information on the first and last of these queries; we were discussing with the British the termination of oil shipments to Communist China, but the matter was complicated by the probability of retaliation against oil company personnel. (Memo by Matthews of SOA) - - - - - TAB 16

17. France notified the UN that it was considering what it could contribute under the SC Resolution of June 27 but emphasized the severe limitations imposed by its heavy commitments "in the same quarter of the globe and for a similar cause". The Philippines notified the UN that it was prepared to contribute various medicines and such commodities as copra, coconut oil, soap and rice. (UN Security Council Documents S/1586, S/1584) - - - - - TAB 17

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July 7, 1950 (Continued)

ANNEXES

(Background and Collateral Material)

- A. Korea Bulletin (OIR 5399.7) - - - - - (TAB A)
- B. Special Information Policy Guidance on Korea  
No. 11 - - - - - (TAB B)
- C. Daily Intelligence Comment (DIC 132, Supplement  
No. 1) - - - - - (TAB C)
- D. World Reaction to Korean Developments,  
No. 10 (OIR) - - - - - (TAB D)



Summary of Actions and Decisions - July 1, 1950

(All entries are in EDT; on incoming telegrams the time of receipt is used.)

**EXCISE**

1. 6:53 a.m. -- Tokyo G-2 reported in a teleconference with the Department of the Army that North Koreans had overrun Suwon, and that no clear picture had yet been obtained as to the success of South Korean efforts to regroup. There was as yet no immediate evidence of overt Chinese Communist or Soviet participation in North Korean operations. Psychological warfare activities had been started with the dropping of 15 million leaflets and regular Korean language broadcasts from Tokyo. (DA TT 3445) - - - - - (TAB 1)

2. 11:28 a.m. -- The JCS authorized the CINCPAC to implement the President's order for a naval blockade of the Korean coast to prevent movement by sea of North Korean forces and supplies. "Care should be taken to keep well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and USSR." (JCS 84808 to CINCPAC) - - - - - (TAB 2)

3. 2:19 p.m. -- Ambassador Woodward reported that the Canadian Foreign Minister had

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"also expressed hope pressure would be exerted on the more vociferous Latin American countries to demonstrate solidarity and make token contributions." (Tel 1) - (TAB 3)

4. 2:21 p.m. -- Ambassador Muccio reported from Taejon that with the arrival of U.S. ground forces there would be no question of ROK determination to carry on. He described Embassy efforts to encourage more effective leadership on the part of South Korean officials. (Tel 1) - - - - - (TAB 4)



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July 1, 1950 (Continued)

5. 4:00 p.m. -- The Department informed Ambassador Muccio of its belief that "the Rhee Government should be prepared to take prompt and decisive counteraction" in the event that certain South Korean officials might be induced, or coerced if captured, into issuing a declaration of political unity with North Korea, including a demand for withdrawal of U.S. and UN support. The counteraction should be "designed to make clear to world ROK still carrying on fight shoulder-to-shoulder with nations engaged in enforcing UN Security Council decisions." (Tel 5 to Tokyo) -- (TAB 5)

6. 6:29 p.m. -- Noting that in the Department's circular telegram of June 30, 5 p.m., there were "certain disturbing connotations" regarding the military situation in Korea, Ambassador Kirk said that we could not "afford a military reverse in Korea," that the earliest possible success for our arms was necessary to avoid considerable loss of prestige, and that he favored "whatever action" could be taken to accomplish an early victory. He reiterated that a protracted and uncertain struggle might tempt the Soviets to throw their weight into the scales more and more. (Tel 7) ----- (TAB 6)

Other Actions, July 1

(Listed here are entries for which no exact time is available.)

7. The U.S. presented an aide-memoire to the Chinese Government in reply to its offer of troops for Korea made on June 30. The reply stated that it would be desirable to discuss plans for the defense of Taiwan prior to any final decision to reduce the defense

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defense forces on the island by transfer of troops to Korea.

Omitted from the aide-memoire was the following concluding sentence in an earlier draft: "Meanwhile it is suggested that the Chinese troops in question be held in a state of readiness."

Mr. Merchant informed the British and Australian Embassies of the gist of the aide-memoire. - - - - - (TAB 7)

8. The NSC executive secretary submitted a report on "The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation." The report stated that there was no evidence yet available invalidating the assumption that the Soviets did not want a general war. Harassing actions in Asia to drain off U.S. strength were expected; however, with the likeliest possibility being the use of Chinese Reds in Korea or against Formosa. It was felt that if the Soviets wanted general war, they would wait until the U.S. commitment in Korea caused us to reach maximum weakness, then would attack in Germany and Austria. (NSC 73) - - - - - *delivered Jan. 9, 1976* - - - - - (TAB 8)

9. Thailand informed the Secretary General that it "is firmly behind the Council in its resolutions" and offered to supply foodstuffs to the Republic of Korea. (S/1547) - - - - - (TAB 9)

10. The Chilean Ambassador telephoned the Department to say that his Government approved the U.S. policy with respect to Korea and would send a note to that effect. (Memo by Sheppard) - (TAB 10)

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11. New Zealand notified the UN that it had ordered two frigates to "join with forces of other governments in giving effect to the Security Council resolution." (Security Council Document) - (TAB 11)

12. Mr. Cordier, Executive Assistant to Secretary General Lie, denied to Mr. Hyde of USUN rumors to the effect that an informal group had been organized by Mr. Lie to deal with military assistance to Korea. (USUN Memo, US/S/1272 - - - - - (TAB 12)

13. At the request of the UN the Department of State allocated 15 minutes a day on Voice of America transmitters for UN programs to reach Korea in Korean. (Memo by Barrett) - - - - - (TAB 13)

July 2

14. 6:58 a.m. --G-2 Tokyo reported in a teleconference that a captured North Korean pilot disclosed all aviation gas was imported from the USSR, that a Soviet major general was said to be directing the North Korean attack, and that there were various other evidences of Soviet military participation. CINCPAC complained that it had been put on the spot continuously by news received from the States concerning movements directed, planned or in progress long before it was desirable to release such information at this headquarters" and that it had been "embarrassed particularly when the Navy named the Juneau as bombarding the Korean coast." The telecon also disclosed that British and Australian naval units had joined U.S. naval forces in Korean waters. (DA TT 3452) - - - - - (TAB 14)

15. 8:09 a.m. --Ambassador Kirk reported that India on July 1 had delivered to Russia a demarche regarding Korea. He had learned that

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July 2, 1950 (Continued)

that the British suggested this step and that the Indian Ambassador had taken a "stiffer line" than either the U.S. or the UK. In reply to the Soviet charge of illegal UN action the Indian had bluntly accused the Soviets of violating Article 28 of the UN Charter by their walkout. Kirk added that the British Embassy had informed him it had been consulted by the Indian Embassy and that the latter on its advice had omitted from the demarche a statement that the breach of peace was the Soviets' "fault".

(Tel 9) ----- (TAB 15)

16. 10:43 a.m. --The CINCFE advised that Korean waters would be patrolled on the East coast to 41 degrees North and on the West to 39-30 degrees North with all ports held by North Koreans placed under blockade. This would keep patrol action clear of Manchurian and USSR coastal water. (CINCFE CX 57097 to Dept. of Army) ----- (TAB 16)

17. 4:55 p.m. --Ambassador Muccio reported that one North Korean column had penetrated to within 10 miles of Suwon on the east and another to within four miles northeast of the city. He said that UNCOK was preparing to establish headquarters in Taejon and start functioning again. (Tel 5) ----- (TAB 17)



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Annexes

(Background and Collateral Material)

July 1

- A. "Korea Bulletin (Oir 5299.1) - - - - - (TAB A)
- B. "Communist Intentions", by OIR Estimates Group (I.E. No. 9) (TAB B)
- C. "World Reaction to Korean Developments", No. 4 - - - - - (TAB C)

July 2

- D. "Korea Bulletin" (Oir 5299.2) - - - - - (TAB D)
- E. "Special Information Policy Guidance on Korea", No. 9 by PA (TAB E)
- F. "World Reaction to Korean Developments", No. 6 (OIR) - - - - (TAB F)

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